US Senate Report says Covid most likely from Lab Leak

"Research-related incident" is the new bio-weapon lab leak

A interim report from Minority Oversight Staff on the Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor and Pensions analysed the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. Their objective was to examine the two prevailing theories: a natural zoonotic outbreak or a research-related incident.

Whilst establishing an approximate timeline was difficult, epidemiological evidence strongly suggests SARS-CoV-2 began infecting humans in Wuhan or the surrounding area in mid-October and early to mid-November 2019.

Remember, Event 201 started on 18 October 2019, as did the Wuhan Military World Games which concluded on 27 October.

The authors conclude that the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 that resulted in the COVID-19 pandemic was most likely the result of a research-related incident.

Zoonotic hypothesis

When analysing the zoonotic spillover hypothesis, the authors say there are a number of anomalies in the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak and the early pandemic when compared with the emergence of past natural zoonotic spillovers.

If SARS-CoV-2 is the result of a zoonotic spillover, it likely needed to circulate in an intermediate host to increase the virus’ chances of being able to infect and replicate in humans…The identity of SARS-CoV-2’s intermediate animal species remains unknown. If such an intermediate animal species exists, where these intermediate species came into contact with and first infected humans is also unknown…Almost three years after the COVID-19 pandemic began there is still no evidence of an animal infected with SARS-CoV-2, or a closely related virus, before the first publicly reported human COVID-19cases in Wuhan in December 2019.

According to the report, government officials in China have postulated the theory that Covid “arrived in China on the surface of imported frozen seafood or was brought into China by infected people or animals after being created by the US military. Support for these alternative theories is limited to government-controlled publications in China and is not credible absent independent corroboration”.

The authors says the genomes of early Covid cases don’t show genetic evidence that the virus recently circulated in another animal species. Furthermore, the samples support the likelihood that the virus was shed by infected humans, rather than animals.

There also do not appear to have been subsequent spillovers of the virus that generated sustained transmission in humans, or any other independent spillovers of SARS-CoV-2, from the intermediate host animal(s) to humans since the pandemic started. It is also noteworthy that the earliest variants of SARSCoV-2 were well-adapted for human-to-human transmission.

Early Covid variants differed by only two nucleotides out of 29,900, indicating that the virus had not been circulating widely or for long. It also suggests that Covid spilled over into humans only once or twice over a two week period and these spillovers resulted in sustained human to human transmission.

A list of facts and gaps in information is produced, explaining why the natural zoonotic hypothesis is unlikely to explain the origins of SARS-CoV-2.

• The intermediate host species remain unidentified;

• Genomes of early cases show no genetic evidence of the virus having circulated in another animal species other than humans;

• SARS-CoV-2’s high binding affinity for human ACE2 receptors suggests it is possible for it to directly infect humans without needing to adapt in an intermediate host;

• Wuhan is the only location where SARS-Cov-2 spilled over into humans; and

• The low genetic diversity of early samples suggest the pandemic is most likely the result of a single successful spillover.

Research-Related Incident hypothesis

This section begins by saying these types of incidents have happened previously, resulting in human to human transmission:

• At least six incidents involving the escape of SARS-CoV from high-containment labs in China (4), Taiwan (1) and Singapore (1);

• The 1977 Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic is now widely accepted to have been the result of a research-related incident (most likely a vaccine trial in the Soviet Union or China); and

• In June 2014 whilst investigating the unintentional exposure of a researcher to anthrax, the CDC discovered that a culture of non-pathogenic avian flu was unintentionally cross-contaminated with the highly pathogenic H5N1 and shipped to a US lab.

The authors say that after SARS research was ramped up to predict and prevent the next pandemic. The main coronavirus research took place in Wuhan. Researchers undertook large scale virus collection expeditions from Southern China and Southeast Asia from 2004 onwards.

One of those viruses, RaTG13 is 96.3% similar to SARS-CoV-2 and its existence was only made public in February 2020.

The collected viruses were then experimented on.

Particular attention was given to SARS-related coronaviruses that have the ability to bind to human ACE2 receptors. These viruses were considered by researchers at the WIV to be potential pandemic pathogens and pose a high-risk for spillover into humans.

The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) conducted genetic recombination experiments as part of its coronavirus research in both BSL2 and BSL3 laboratories. The WIV also conducted transgenic humanized mice experiments to assess the pandemic potential of SARS-related viruses. They also tested the efficacy of vaccines in these mice and other animal species. These animal experiments generate highly-infectious aerosols that are “ubiquitous… and are difficult to detect.” There were concerns about conducting this type of research in a BSL2 laboratory.

By 2018, the WIV showed interest in finding SARS related coronavirus that used human ACE2 receptors to enter cells.

This research effort is described in a March 2018 grant proposal submitted to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) by a consortium of research entities, including the WIV, led by the U.S.-based non-governmental organization EcoHealth Alliance. The group proposed to collect and conduct genetic recombination experiments on SARS-related coronaviruses possessing specific traits making them “high-risk” for zoonotic spillover into animals and humans.

Notably, the proposal describes the WIV’s intent to search for SARS-related coronaviruses with potential to bind to human ACE2 receptors and that have naturally occurring furin cleavage sites. if WIV researchers were unable to find a SARS-related virus with these traits during sampling expeditions, they then proposed to manipulate the ACE2 receptors of SARS-related coronaviruses to increase binding affinity to human lung tissue and to insert furin cleavage sites at the same location where one appears in SARS-CoV-2.

The report states that in 2019, in China, researchers inserted a four amino acid furin cleavage site into Infectious Bronchitis coronavirus that affects poultry.

It also discusses an interview in Science by Shi Zhengli (the ‘bat lady’).

[She] disclosed that her team infected civets and mice that expressed human ACE2 receptors with chimeric SARS-related coronaviruses. The results of these experiments indicated that SARS-related bat coronaviruses could infect and cause severe illness in humanized mice.

Looking at patents between 2018 and 2020 it is clear that the WIV struggled to maintain key biosafety capabilities. Example of these patents and procurements include fans designed to prevent the loss of negative pressure, upgraded disinfection systems, air conditioning renovations; air incinerators; sensors to detect failed filters and a disinfectant formulation that reduced corrosion.

In 2019 a number of biosafety and biosecurity events occurred at the WIV. In May, the Director of the WIV said:

Maintenance cost[s] [are] generally neglected; several high-level BSLs have insufficient operational funds for routine yet vital processes. Due to the limited resources, some BSL-3 laboratories run on extremely minimal operational costs or in some cases none at all…

Currently, most laboratories lack specialized biosafety managers and engineers. In such facilities, some of the skilled staff is composed by part time researchers. This makes it difficult to identify and mitigate potential safety hazards in facility and equipment operation early enough. Nonetheless, biosafety awareness, professional knowledge, and operational skill training still need to be improved among laboratory personnel. (emphasis added)

On 12 September 2019, between the hours of 2 and 3 am, the WIV took down its database of viral sequences. It was intermittently accessible between December 2019 and February 2020 before being permanently taken offline.

Vaccine development in China vs Operation Warp Speed

The report details the various vaccines produced under Operation Warp Speed and the time they took to develop. In contrast, China’s adenovirus vaccine, similar to AstraZeneca and J&J went into clinical trials in only 67 days.

The report says that, given Operation Warp Speed’s success, it is unusual that the Chinese vaccines reached early milestones even more quickly. They ask how were they able to do it so much quicker and did they have access to the genomic sequence earlier than when it was made public in January 2020?

In conclusion, the authors say “it appears reasonable to conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic was, more likely than not, the result of a research-related incident. They say that advocates of the zoonosis theory need to provide verifiable evidence that a natural zoonotic spillover actually occurred, not simply that such a spillover was possible. Critical questions need to be answered to prove their theory:

• What is the intermediate host species for SARS-CoV-2? Where did it first infect humans?

• Where is SARS-CoV-2’s viral reservoir?

• How did SARS-CoV-2 acquire its unique genetic features, such as its furin cleavage site?

An interesting report which, considering the authors, focuses the majority of the attention on China and their labs. It should have also looked at US labs and the work that was being done in co-operation with the WIV. It is also interesting that they use the term “research-related incident” and at no point use the term Gain Of Function.

Overall, it is a good summary of much of the information many of us already knew but great that it is coming from the Senate and being made public.